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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the role of interlocking directors of Pakistani business groups and 
financial performance. In panel regression the effect of vertical interlocks, intra-group 
interlocks, leverage and sales growth are tested. Through empirical testing it is argued that 
vertical interlock is statistically significant and positive but intra-group interlock is stati-
cally insignificant and negative. The result suggests that vertical interlocking directors are 
playing key role to increase the financial performance of group member firms. A vertical 
interlocking director increases financial performance of group firm by supporting in coor-
dination and promotion of transactions between group member firm and holding firm. The 
sample consists of 55 public limited firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) and 
covering period is 2011 to 2015. 
1. Introduction 
Business groups are the key players of Pakistan’s economy. They consist of legally inde-
pendent firms operating in different industries and bound together by formal and informal ties. 
These group affiliated firms are together by direct or indirect controlling stakes owned by ulti-
mate shareholder or by cross-shareholdings. The key of this study is to configure the impact of 
interlocking directors on firm’s financial performance. Interlocking take place when a director 
sits on his firm board and one other firm’s board. It is a common practice in business groups to 
share directors between group affiliated firms; by doing this they are controlling the affairs of 
holding and group affiliated firms. The aim of the study is to see whether vertical and intra-group 
interlocking of directors increases financial performance or not? Keister (1998) and De. (2003) in 
China and India respectively have observed that interlocking directorates in business groups are 
playing key role to shape the performance of group affiliated firms.  
In many studies, it has been observed that intra-group interlocks are used as a tool to 
control and coordinate group affiliated firms, and more importantly to channelize informa-
tion among group firms (Orru et al., 1989; Collin, 1998; Keister 1998). Maman (2001) 
viewed that intra-group interlocks are representing the market of internal directors; it’s an 
opportunity for directors to move in different group affiliated firms for diverse experience, 
learning and culture. 
In this study, the impact of interlocking directorates on financial performance of group 
affiliated firms has been investigated for a sample of 55 Pakistani firms and covering pe-
riod is 2011 to 2015. Pakistani business groups provides an interesting environment to 
study interlocks, reason is family controlled financial and non-financial groups are playing 
key role in the accumulation and allocation of capital, this case can also be seen in Indian, 
Bangladesh and China. In this study mainly intra-group interlocks and vertical interlocks 
have been studied. Intra-group interlock is defined as the directors having positions in 
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more than one group affiliated firm. Vertical interlock is defined as the directors sitting in 
parent firm as well as in group affiliated firm. Vertical interlocking is a common practice 
in business groups because of intra-group resource sharing; this needs strong coordination 
and monitoring. Vertical interlocking helps in quick decision making and control. 
Maman (1999) stated that vertical interlock is more useful in diversified business 
groups than focused groups in order to avoid control and coordination problems. There are 
different hierarchy levels of directorship; it has been observed that directors with high 
level positions are holding more directorship than lower levels. Interestingly, in family 
owned firms the sons and daughters of owners are holding positions almost in every group 
affiliated firm. Maman (2001) reported that placement of trustworthy directors specially 
those who are holding high positions in the group improves coordination between parent 
and affiliated firm and minimize opportunistic behaviour in group members. 
The plan of study is to empirically explore the association between financial perform-
ance as dependent variable and independent variables that are vertical interlocking, intra-
group interlocking, leverage and sales growth measures. The question is whether inter-
locking directorates and solvency measures contribute to improve the financial perform-
ance of group member or not? The earlier studies on interlocking have furnished sound 
help for the current study. In this study; the direct relationship between dependent variable 
and independent variables has been investigated. Moreover; this study is based on histori-
cal data to see the relationship of defined variables.   
The quantitative method is used to analyze the data. The fixed effect and random effect 
models have been applied to panel data to observe the influence of interlocking director-
ates and solvency measures on financial performance of group firms. Since, the results 
indicate that independent variables vertical interlocking and sales growth is positively 
correlated with financial performance. The results are statistically significant in case of 
vertical interlocking and solvency. 
2. Literature Review 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have concluded that resource dependence is one of the 
greatest reasons for interlocking among boards. This is argued that to reduce uncertainty, 
interlocks are established. In many studies it is rationalized that a firm makes connection 
through an interlock to  assure access to external resources.  Thus, interlocking is viewed 
as sharing device. As a result, sharing of directors, uncertaininty is reduced. Therefore, in 
order to confirm resource dependency, because resource dependency reduces uncertaininty 
and assure the availibility of resources that in returnraise profits. The firm’s profit level 
will increase if interlocking directors offers additional information to a company (Burt 
1980, Burt 1983, Boyd 1990, and Langa nd Lockhart 1990). 
Schoorman et al., (1981) and Haunschild & Beckman (1998) investigated that directors 
interlocking leads to more profitability since they assist in proper flow of information 
among firm and its partners and financiers. In addition, the sharing of experienced and 
visionary directors may also contribute to higher profitability. On the other side, it is ar-
gued that busy directors are less effective; because they don’t have much time to dedicate 
them to all group firms equally, thereby decreasing profitability (Shivdasani and Yermac, 
1999; Ferris et al., Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) have pointed out two different hypotheses. First, interlock 
may show the quality of directors. A director having multiple seats on different firms’ 
136 
boards showing his wider acceptance of expertise and sincerity in his profession.  In this 
case, multiple directorships will support active monitoring and decrease agency costs. This 
ultimately increases the confidence of shareholders and lead to higher market capitaliza-
tion and goodwill. Second, negative view, membership of too many boards makes direc-
tors busy and they do not function as effective monitors. This increases agency cost and 
managers serve their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders and it result in 
negative relationship between market return and outside directorships. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) observed that if a firm has many outside directors those 
who are serving three or more than three firms board will have significantly lower market 
to book ratios, as compare to those firms where directors are serving only one or two 
board seats but not more three. Therefore, serving less than three boards is economically 
significant and good for financial health of a firm.  
Kuntluru et al., (2008) found a signficant positive association between sales growth 
and fianncial performance of firm. As the sales growth is increasing the return on assets in 
increasing. It shows the efficiency of marketing team to find the new markets and 
customers. 
Devos et al., (2009) evidenced that interlocking is negatively correlated with perform-
ance of firms. The poorly performing firms are more likely to interlock directors on their 
board and market negative reacts on the announcement of appointment of directors that 
creates interlocks.  
Mrizak (2009) concluded that performance of a firm is a function of the position of a 
company to others in the whole network. The results suggest that firm location in the 
network is more important than simply the number of ties. 
Tauseef et al. (2015) reported that sales growth has positve association and statistically 
significant impact on financial performance of a firm’s. Initially increase in total debt-to-
total asset ratio increases financial performance until an optimal debt level is achieved but 
after that it starts decreasing. 
3. Research Methods and Data 
The interlocking director’s data is taken from the annual reports of individual group af-
filiated firms. The data is carefully taken by comparing the annual reports of group affili-
ated firms from 2011 to 2015. This is the requirement of Securities Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan (SECP), Companies Ordinance 1984; that every public limited company has to 
report the names of board of directors under the heading of corporate information. There-
fore, the annual report of public limited company is considered as most valuable source of 
directors interlocking. 
Five years data 2011 to 2015 of financial performance, sales growth and leverage have 
been collected from the balance sheet analysis of non-financial sector reported by the state 
bank of Pakistan (SBP). In this study the size of sample is 55 companies and275 observa-
tions. The quantitative method is used to analyze the data. The nature of data for this study 
is panel data. The panel data is also called longitudinal data; N (companies) units are ana-
lyzed for T time. It is a combination of time series and cross sectional data.  
The panel regression technique is used. The relationship between financial perform-
ance and independent variables has been examined by applying statistical tool. The pre-
sent study has used STATA 11 for data analysis. Commonly, fixed effect and random 
effect models are used for panel data analysis. The STATA is used for fixed effect and 
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random effect analysis to see the impact of independent variables on dependent variable. 
In order to decide between fixed effects and random effects model, Hausman test is 
needed to run. The Hausman test provides the decision criteria which is the preferred 
model either fixed or random effects. According to Hausman test if probability value is 
less than (p < 0.05); in that case fixed effect model is preferred.  
The following explanation describes the measurement of variables related to financial 
performance, board interlocking, sales growth and leverage. The prime variable of interest 
in this study is the interlocking directorship. The interlocking directorship is measured in 
two way; vertical interlocking andintra-group interlocking.  
3.1. Dependent Variable 
Financial Performance: The dependent variable fianncial performance is return on 
assets (ROA) i.e. measured in percentage form. 
3.2. Independent Variables 
Vertical interlocking: vertical interlocking is measured by the log of interlocks the 
company has with parent firm belonging to the same group.Vertical interlocking is 
positively coorelated with financial performance of group affiliated firm. As it increases 
the coordination between parent firm and affiliated firm. 
Intra-group interlocking: intra-group interlocking indicates the number of directors of 
one group member firm are sitting on another group memeber firm’s board. intra-group 
interlocking is measured by the log of all interlocks the firm has with firms belonging to the 
same group. Intra-group interlocking is negatively coorerlated with financial performance of 
group affiliated firm.  
Leverage: it is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Leverage is negatively 
correlated with financial performance of firm. Leverage indicates the amount of debt a 
firm using to finance assets. A firm with more debt as compare to equity is considered to 
be highly leveraged. More debt more interest payments that in return decrease profits of a 
firm. 
Sales growth: growth is measured by log of sales growth (sales in 2011 / sales in 2010) 
and it is positively correlated with financial performance of group firm. 
3.3. Hypotheses 
H1: – Vertical interlocking positively impact financial performance. 
H2: – Intra-group interlocking negatively impact financial performance. 
H3: – Leverage negatively impact financial performance. 
H4: – Sales growth positively impact financial performance. 
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3.4. Research Modell 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
To analyze the effect of interlocking directors on firm performance, the independent 
variables are regressed against return on assets. The return on assets is measured by com-
pany’s annual earnings divided by total assets over the period 2011 to 2015. The higher 
ROA is preferred because it shows that company is earning more with less investment. 
The correlation results in Table 1 show that there is a positive correlation (.104) be-
tween vertical interlocking and financial performance. When vertical interlocking direc-
tors are increasing on the board of group member firms, they will improve the financial 
performance of firms. Vertical interlocking directors have positive impact on financial 
performance of group members. This indicates that vertical interlocking does not hurt the 
performance of group members. 
The correlation between intra-group interlocking and financial performance is about  
-.023. The relationship between these two variables is negative, which indicates that as 
intra-group interlocking increase, financial performance decrease.  
 
Table 1.: Correlation between dependent and independent variables 
Correlation with financial performance 
Vertical interlocking 104 
Intra-group interlocking -.023 
Leverage -.432 
Sales growth .0365 
 
The correlation between leverage and financial performance is negative. The correla-
tion between leverage and performance is about -.432. It is showing that increasing debt 
will increase interest cost since it will decrease profitability of firm. Sales growth is posi-
tively correlated with financial performance of firm. The correlation between sales growth 
and performance is about .0365. Increasing sales growth increases financial performance. 
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           Table 2: Regression Coefficient Estimates 
    Financial  
 Performance  
   coefficients P-value Z-statistics 
Intercept / Constant 8.592 0.085 1.72 
Vertical Interlocking 6.601 0.044 2.02* 
Intra-group interlocking -4.016 0.226 -1.21 
Leverage -.1279 .000 -5.63*** 
Sales growth .651 0.064 1.85 
R-square .0751 
Waldchi  36.35 0.0000 
         Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
 
Table-2 includes p-values, z-statistics, R square (R2)and Wald chi significance value. It 
is observed that R2 = 0.0751 or 7.51% variation in financial performance is observed. The 
R2 is coefficient of determination; it measures the variation of dependent variable due to 
independent variables. Thus, the vertical interlocking, intra-group interlocking, leverage 
and sales growth are used in the model as independent variables, have 7.51% impact on 
the financial performance which is dependent variable. The above table shows the impact 
of vertical interlocking, intra-group interlocking, leverage and sales growth on financial 
performance of firms.  
The significance Wald chi (F test) measures the overall fitness of model whether the 
model is statistically significant or not? The F-significance value is 36 35 (p < 0.0000); it 
indicates the overall fitness of model; that the relationship between dependent variable and 
independent variables is statistically justified. In this study, random effect model is pre-
ferred, according to Hausman test the probability value is more than (p > 0.05) i.e. signifi-
cant. The coefficient table is providing estimates of the z-statistics and p value. In this coef-
ficient table z value is also mentioned. It is showing the ability of influence of independent 
variables on financial performance. All the independent variables can be ranked with the 
help of this z value. Variables with high z value are more influential as compare to those 
with lower z value. Leverage is having the highest rating among other variables because z 
value is higher, thus in this study it is the most influential variable on financial performance. 
In Pakistani business groups the owners of group are holding the positions of directors; 
they are controlling the affairs of group affiliated companies by sitting on the board of 
almost every affiliated firm. The owners of group are primarily holding the positions of 
vertical interlocking directors and their role is more influential than intra-group directors. 
It is also observed that group firms are strongly vertically interlocked as compare to intra-
group interlocking. They are responsible for decision making and better financial per-
formance. The role of vertical interlocking directors is statistically significant z 2.02  
(P .044) it shows that they are making good coordination and maintaining relationship 
balance between holding firm and group members. The results are consistent with Collin 
(1998) and Keister (1998) interlocking directors may increase financial performance of firm 
because they facilitate information flows between a firm and its partners and financiers. 
The z value of intra-group interlocking is -1.21 (p .226), which is statistically insignificant.  
But intra-group interlocking has negative impact on financial performance of group members.  
The intra-group interlocking directors have no influence on board decisions. It is observed that 
intra-group interlocking directors are not the facilitators of controlling shareholders. 
The results suggest that vertical interlocking directors are much more important than 
intra-group directors. There are two possible reasons for interlocking directors having 
negative impact on financial performance, first reason is they are too busy and sitting on 
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the board is just formality; second when number of directors are increasing on the board 
might affect the performance of competent directors. The result of intra-group interlocking 
is consistent with Loderer and Peyer (2002) and Fich et al. (2006), they found a negative 
relationship between interlocking and firm performance. One possible explanation for this 
negative explanation is proposed in the literature is that busy directors can dedicate less 
time and less effective. Meeusen and Cuyvers (1985) and Silva et al., (2006) argued that 
the controller of groups is using intra-group directors as a tool to expropriate value from 
group firms, thereby reducing profitability. 
The z value of leverage is -5.63 (p .000), which is statistically significant. The associa-
tion between leverage and financial performance is negative; it indicates that when the 
level of debt is increasing since it decreases financial performance. The interest payments 
will negatively affect the profitability of firm.Sales growth has positive association with 
financial performance of firm. The z value of sales growth is 1.85 (p .064), which is stati-
cally insignificant. But positive relationship shows increase in sales growth increases fi-
nancial performance of group member firm. 
Conclusion 
The study concludes positive association between dependent variable financial 
performance and indpendent variables vertical interlocking and sales growth measures in 
Pakistan’s business groups considering data for 5 years 2011–2015. The negative 
interaction is also observed between financial performance and intra-group interlocking 
and leverage. The findings of the study show a statisically significant association in case 
of vertical interlocking and leverage with financial performance of group affiliated firms.  
It is concluded that vertical interlocking is beneficial for parent firm and group member 
firm; vertical interlocking directors are providing helping hand in different forms (i) better 
coordination and monitoring (ii) facilitate information flows (iii) controlling group 
members (iv) to keep unity with in the group (v)communication network within group (vi) 
to align group member objectives with parent firm. 
In Pakistani context business groups are involved in intra-group resources sharing; this 
resource sharing is in several forms e.g. internal buying and selling of goods and services, 
internal borrowing and lending, sharing human resource and tecnology sharing. To control 
and monitor the intragroup resource sharing, vertical interlocking is needed for central 
coordination.The study concluded a negative and statistically insignificant assoication 
between intra-group interlocking and financial performance; the controller of the group is 
using intra-group interlocking to expropriate value from group members. 
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